Mind - recent issues

Knowledge and Presuppositions

Blome-Tillmann, M. — 2009-05-14

The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’, namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of ‘knows’ in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility with the intuitions of Moorean dogmatists. Finally, the paper shows that the account defended is not subject to the most prominent and familiar philosophical objections to epistemic contextualism discussed in the recent literature.

Modalism and Logical Pluralism

Bueno, O., Shalkowski, S. A. — 2009-05-14

Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses.

Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism

Clarke, R. — 2009-05-14

This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.

Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency

Bridges, J. — 2009-05-14

Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny's defence of it—particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it is not—is unsuccessful.

Reply to Bridges

Kolodny, N. — 2009-05-14

Bridges (2009) argues that the ‘Transparency Account’ (TA) of Kolodny 2005 has a hidden flaw. The TA does not, after all, account for the fact that (1) in our ordinary, engaged thought and talk about rationality; we believe that, when it would be irrational of one of us to refuse to A, he has, because of this, conclusive reason to A. My reply is that this was the point. For reasons given in Kolodny 2005, (1) is false. The aim of the TA is to o.er an interpretation of our engaged thought and talk that is compatible with the falsity of (1) and that helps to explain why, when reflecting on our thought and talk, we are so prone to misrepresent what it involves. After making these points, I consider alternative senses in which rationality might be, or be taken by us to be, ‘normative’ and conclude that these alternatives have little bearing on the TA.

Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility

Hawthorne, J., Magidor, O. — 2009-05-14

In his seminal paper ‘Assertion’, Robert Stalnaker distinguishes between the semantic content of a sentence on an occasion of use and the content asserted by an utterance of that sentence on that occasion. While in general the assertoric content of an utterance is simply its semantic content, the mechanisms of conversation sometimes force the two apart. Of special interest in this connection is one of the principles governing assertoric content in the framework, one according to which the asserted content ought to be identical at each world in the context set (the Uniformity principle).

In this paper, we present a problem for Stalnaker's meta-semantic framework, by challenging the plausibility of the Uniformity principle. We argue that the interaction of the framework with facts about epistemic accessibility—in particular, failures of epistemic transparency—cause problems for the Uniformity principle and thus for Stalnaker's framework more generally.

On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility

Stalnaker, R. C. — 2009-05-14

Hawthorne and Magidor's criticisms of the model of presupposition and assertion that I have used and defended are all based on a rejection of some transparency or introspection of assumptions about speaker presupposition. This response to those criticisms aims first to clarify, and then to defend, the required transparency assumptions. It is argued, first, that if the assumptions are properly understood, some prima facie problems for them do not apply, second, that rejecting the assumptions has intuitively implausible consequences, and third, that the ‘margin of error’ argument against the principle of positive introspection has a false premiss. The paper concludes with a response to a criticism of what Hawthorne and Magidor call ‘the uniformity principle’ that is used in the model to explain some pragmatic phenomena.

The Conjunction and Disjunction Theses

Jago, M. — 2009-05-14

Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues for the disjunction thesis but against the conjunction thesis. I argue that accepting the disjunction thesis undermines his argument against the conjunction thesis.

Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers

Lopez de Sa, D. — 2009-05-14

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis—if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts—, and rejects the conjunction thesis—if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and contend that Rodriguez-Pereyra's general defence of it fails. Then I defend the conjunction thesis from Rodriguez-Pereyra's case against it.

The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses

Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. — 2009-05-14

This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction Thesis and my case against the Conjunction Thesis. I shall show that his objections are unfounded and based on serious misunderstandings of my position, what the relevant debate is, and some fundamental notions of Truthmaker Theory.

Jago argues that accepting the Disjunction Thesis and rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is hard to maintain. But I show that Jago has not shown that accepting the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis is impossible or even hard to maintain. Jago believes that, to accept the Disjunction Thesis while rejecting the Conjunction Thesis, one needs to reject his axiom (T₃), which says that all the truthmakers for are truthmakers for

. I argue that there are reasons to reject such a principle, and the version of it that says that what makes true makes

true.

Review: Stephen Boulter: The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy

Preti, C. — 2009-05-14

Review: Thom Brooks: Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right

Tunick, M. — 2009-05-14

Review: Rosalind Carey: Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement

Beaney, M. — 2009-05-14

Review: Ursula Coope: Time for Aristotle: Physics IV.10-14

Roark, T. — 2009-05-14

Review: Paul Crowther: Defining Art, Creating the Canon

Zinkin, M. — 2009-05-14

Review: R. A. Du: Answering for Crime

Tadros, V. — 2009-05-14

Review: Owen Flanagan: The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World

Hasker, W. — 2009-05-14

Review: Wolfram Hinzen: An Essay on Names and Truth

Paul, I., Stainton, R. J. — 2009-05-14

Review: Axel Honneth: Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea

Sayers, S. — 2009-05-14

Review: Jennifer Lackey: Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge

Faulkner, P. — 2009-05-14

Review: Robin Le Poidevin: The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation

Hoerl, C. — 2009-05-14

Review: Jerrold Levinson: Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics

Schellekens, E. — 2009-05-14

Review: Hallvard Lillehammer: Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity

Cuneo, T. — 2009-05-14

Review: Geoffrey Lloyd: Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind

Cooper, R. — 2009-05-14

Review: Penelope Maddy: Second Philosophy

Stroud, B. — 2009-05-14

Review: Bradley Monton: Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen

Douven, I. — 2009-05-14

Review: Jesse J. Prinz: The Emotional Construction of Morals

Joyce, R. — 2009-05-14

Review: Bernard Reginster: The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism

Janaway, C. — 2009-05-14

Review: Robert C. Richardson: Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology

Walter, S. — 2009-05-14

Review: Christopher Shields: Aristotle

Gregoric, P. — 2009-05-14

Review: Kathleen Stock: Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work

Iseminger, G. — 2009-05-14

Review: Robert Wicks: Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Judgment

Zuckert, R. — 2009-05-14

Review: Christopher Woodard: Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation

Mulgan, T. — 2009-05-14

Books Received

2009-05-14

Announcements

2009-05-14

No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails

Bykvist, K. — 2009-01-30

Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has in itself. Much less attention has been paid to the problem of identifying the relevant attitudes in virtue of which value is supposed to be defined. An old complaint, however, is that the FA-analysis is bound to be circular, because the fitting attitude is best seen as an evaluative judgement or an evaluative experience. In this paper, I am arguing that the challenge to find a non-circular account is deepened by the fact that on many popular non-evaluative understandings of favouring, there are good states of a.airs that it is never fitting to favour, because it is logically impossible or irrational to favour them. I will also show that the remaining candidate of favouring, ‘imaginative emotional feeling’, will generate a new version of the wrong-reason objection if it is put to use in the FAaccount. I shall conclude that the prospects of finding a non-circular FA-analysis look bleak.

Against Content Normativity

Gluer, K., Wikforss, A. — 2009-01-30

As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: ‘CE normativism’, according to which it is essential to content that certain ‘oughts’ can be derived from it, and ‘CD normativism’, according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection between content and correctness conditions. But, we argue, this fact is by itself normatively innocent, and attempts to add a normative dimension via the normativity of belief ultimately fail. CD normativism, in turn, falls prey to the ‘dilemma of regress and idleness’: the appeal to rules either leads to some form of regress of rules, or the notion of rule-following is reduced to an idle label. We conclude by suggesting that our arguments do not support naturalism: it is a mistake to assume that normativism and naturalism are our only options.

Necessities and Necessary Truths: A Prolegomenon to the Use of Modal Logic in the Analysis of Intensional Notions

Halbach, V., Welch, P. — 2009-01-30

In philosophical logic necessity is usually conceived as a sentential operator rather than as a predicate. An intensional sentential operator does not allow one to express quantified statements such as ‘There are necessary a posteriori propositions’ or ‘All laws of physics are necessary’ in first-order logic in a straightforward way, while they are readily formalized if necessity is formalized by a predicate. Replacing the operator conception of necessity by the predicate conception, however, causes various problems and forces one to reject many philosophical accounts involving necessity that are based on the use of operator modal logic. We argue that the expressive power of the predicate account can be restored if a truth predicate is added to the language of first-order modal logic, because the predicate ‘is necessary’ can then be replaced by ‘is necessarily true’. We prove a result showing that this substitution is technically feasible. To this end we provide partial possible-worlds semantics for the language with a predicate of necessity and perform the reduction of necessities to necessary truths. The technique applies also to many other intensional notions that have been analysed by means of modal operators.

Identity and Indiscernibility

Hawley, K. — 2009-01-30

Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.

Rigidity and Essentiality: Reply to Gomez-Torrente

Ahmed, A. — 2009-01-30

Mario Gómez-Torrente (2006) says that whilst theoretical identifications (e.g. ‘All lightning is electrical discharge’) do not entail their own necessitations, they do entail the necessitation of a weaker statement. And he claims that this weaker entailment serves Kripke's purposes as well as the stronger one would have. I argue that this is false. Section 1 says what the weaker entailment is; section 2 says why it matters. Section 3 argues that the entailment identified at section 1 does not meet the purpose identified at section 2. Section 4 rejects two possible objections. The aim is to illustrate (not establish) the general claim that those ‘modal facts’ that are not entirely speculative are quite useless.

Essentiality and Theoretical Identifications: Reply to Ahmed

Gomez-Torrente, M. — 2009-01-30

In reply to Arif Ahmed, I argue that the apparatus of essentiality and qualified and unqualified possibilist identifications, developed in my paper ‘Rigidity and Essentiality’, can be used to provide a flawless reconstruction of several Kripkean ideas about the semantics of typical natural kind predicates, the essence of natural kinds, the contingency of usual descriptive identifications, and the arguments against psychophysical identity theories.

Erratum to Mind, vol. 117, number 468

2009-01-30

Review: John Bishop: Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

Poston, T. — 2009-01-30

Review: Craig Bourne: A Future for Presentism

Dowe, P. — 2009-01-30

Review: T. A. Cavanaugh: Double Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil

Ellis, A. — 2009-01-30

Review: Rachel Cooper: Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science

Bortolotti, L. — 2009-01-30

Review: Paul W. Franks: All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism

Dudley, W. — 2009-01-30

Review: Miranda Fricker: Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

Kusch, M. — 2009-01-30

Review: Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi: The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

Toribio, J. — 2009-01-30

Review: Daniel D. Hutto: Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy

Koethe, J. — 2009-01-30

Review: P. J. E. Kail: Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

Loeb, L. E. — 2009-01-30

Review: Peter Kivy: The Performance of Reading: An Essay in the Philosophy of Literature

Ribeiro, A. C. — 2009-01-30

Review: Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu: Nietzsche and Morality

Katsafanas, P. — 2009-01-30

Review: Robert B. Louden: The World We Want

Gaukroger, S. — 2009-01-30

Review: Tim Maudlin: The Metaphysics Within Physics

Lange, M. — 2009-01-30

Review: David Pears: Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Ahmed, A. — 2009-01-30

Review: Aaron Ridley: Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Art

Wicks, R. — 2009-01-30

Review: Sydney Shoemaker: Physical Realization

Gibb, S. C. — 2009-01-30

Review: Charles Travis: Thought's Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

Miller, A. — 2009-01-30

Review: Margaret Urban Walker: Moral Repair

Bennett, C. — 2009-01-30

Review: Jonathan A. Waskan: Models and Cognition

Jago, M. — 2009-01-30

Review: David Wong: Natural Moralities

Bloomfield, P. — 2009-01-30

Books Received

2009-01-30

Announcements

2009-01-30

Rationality without Reasons

Baker, J. — 2008-11-18

This paper challenges the assumption that reasons are intrinsic to rational action. A great many actions are not best understood as ones in which the agent acted for reasons—and yet they can be understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism. The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving, practical arguments in daily life presents a general philosophical problem. It reflects the existence of a class of ways in which reason can regulate action, which goes far beyond producing reasons or applying principles. Much practical reasoning takes the form of what H. P. Grice called ‘thought-transitions’. These are neither in the form of standard practical arguments, nor can they be so reconstructed without distorting the ways in which an agent thinks. Some actions to which one is led by a thought transition are rational, namely when what Grice called a ‘propension’ towards a given class of actions—a standing inclination to act in certain ways—would itself stand up to rational evaluation. The paper examines two bases for such endorsement, one local and limited, and one much more speculative, due to Grice himself.

Indicative Conditionals in Context

Block, E. — 2008-11-18

I discuss an argument given by Dorothy Edgington for the conclusion that indicative conditionals cannot express propositions. The argument is not effective against Robert Stalnaker's context-dependent propositional theory. I isolate and defend the feature of Stalnaker's theory that allows it to evade the argument.

Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals

Choi, S. — 2008-11-18

For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be argued that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which is generally thought to be dead, is in fact an adequate analysis of dispositions. I will go on to discuss Mumford's view of dispositions from the perspective of the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.

Masked Abilities and Compatibilism

Fara, M. — 2008-11-18

An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents’ abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism concerning free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the ‘master argument’ for incompatibilism is unsound.

Analytic Philosophy and History: A Mismatch?

Glock, H.-J. — 2008-11-18

In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of philosophy is not the whole of philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history.

In Defence of Repugnance

Huemer, M. — 2008-11-18

I defend the ‘Repugnant’ Conclusion that for any possible population of happy people, a population containing a sufficient number of people with lives barely worth living would be better. Four lines of argument converge on this conclusion, and the conclusion has a simple, natural theoretical explanation. The opposition to the Repugnant Conclusion rests on a bare appeal to intuition. This intuition is open to charges of being influenced by multiple distorting factors. Several theories of population ethics have been devised to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but each generates even more counterintuitive consequences. The intuition opposing the Repugnant Conclusion is thus among the best candidates for an intuition that should be revised.

Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which

Kalderon, M. E. — 2008-11-18

Metamerism, the capacity of some colours to present the same colour appearance in some scenes and conditions of illumination, can raise an epistemological problem. In an environment known to be populated by metameric pairs, a perceiver does not know which colour he is perceiving. Metamerism may pose the problem, but colour constancy provides the solution. In varying the conditions of illumination, the colour will present a different colour appearance, allowing the perceiver to distinguish it from its metameric pair thus allowing him to know which colour he is perceiving. The central question of this paper is what experience must be like in order for this to be so. I argue that colour experience must have a presentational phenomenology if it can have this epistemic significance.

Nature loves to hide.

Heraclitus

Situated Normativity: The Normative Aspect of Embodied Cognition in Unreflective Action

Rietveld, E. — 2008-11-18

In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein's examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein's insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein's ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert's socio-cultural practice and the individual's situated and lived normativity.

Visual Attention, Conceptual Content, and Doing it Right

Wu, W. — 2008-11-18

Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact's conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of the function and appropriate ways to use these artefacts, understanding that requires possession of the relevant concept. As a result, we attend to the artefact's relevant functional properties. In these cases, attention is structured by concepts.

Review: What Does the Structure of Intentional Action Tell Us About Our Reasons for Action?

Buss, S. — 2008-11-18

The Co-ordination Principles: A Problem for Bilateralism

Ferreira, F. — 2008-11-18

In ‘"Yes" and "No"’ (2000), Ian Rumfitt proposed bilateralism—a use-based account of the logical words, according to which the sense of a sentence is determined by the conditions under which it is asserted and denied. One of Rumfitt's key claims is that bilateralism can provide a justification of classical logic. This paper raises a techical problem for Rumfitt's proposal, one that seems to undermine the bilateralist programme.

The division of thoughts (judgements) into affirmative and negative is of no use to logic, and I doubt if it can be carried through.

Gottlob Frege

Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter

Co-ordination Principles: A Reply

Rumfitt, I. — 2008-11-18

I explain why Fernando Ferreira's interesting formal result does not threaten the bilateralist account of the sense of the connectives.

Review: Ruth M. J. Byrne: The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality

Butterfill, S. — 2008-11-18

Review: Timothy Chappell (ed.): Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics

Kristjansson, K. — 2008-11-18

Review: Jonardon Ganeri: The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology

Martin, R. — 2008-11-18

Review: Alvin I. Goldman: Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading

Robbins, P. — 2008-11-18

Review: Paul Guyer: Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics

Wilkerson, T. E. — 2008-11-18

Review: Jeff Jordan: Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God

Duncan, C. — 2008-11-18

Review: John Kekes: The Enlargement of Life: Moral Imagination at Work

Kupperman, J. — 2008-11-18

Review: Brian Leiter: Naturalising Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy

Rodriguez-Blanco, V. — 2008-11-18

Review: Tim Lewens: Darwin

Ruse, M. — 2008-11-18

Review: Hendrik Lorenz: The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle

Beere, J. — 2008-11-18

Review: Graham MacDonald and David Papineau (eds): Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays

Maclaurin, J. — 2008-11-18

Review: Marie McGinn: Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Logic and Language

Zalabardo, J. L. — 2008-11-18

Review: Stephen Mulhall: Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations {section}{section}243-315

Schonbaumsfeld, G. — 2008-11-18

Review: Casey O'Callaghan: Sounds: A Philosophical Theory

Kulvicki, J. — 2008-11-18

Review: Samir Okasha: Evolution and the Levels of Selection

Haber, M. — 2008-11-18

Review: Eric T. Olson: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology

Baker, L. R. — 2008-11-18

Review: R. M. Sainsbury: Reference without Referents

Szabo, Z. G. — 2008-11-18

Review: John R. Searle: Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power

Schlosser, M. — 2008-11-18

Review: Kieran Setiya: Reasons without Rationalism

Wedgwood, R. — 2008-11-18

Review: Robert C. Solomon: Dark Feelings, Grim Thoughts: Experience and Reflection in Camus and Sartre

Glendinning, S. — 2008-11-18

Books Received

2008-11-18

Announcements

2008-11-18

Index 2008

2008-11-18