

moral hazard for militarily powerful nations. Their combatants are morally permitted simply to disregard the justice of the cause they fight for; which promotes a feedback loop of acquiescence (e.g. 'support our troops') that enables these nations to fight unjust wars; which emboldens their political and military leaders to embark on or sustain such wars; which increases the likelihood that they will win or not devastatingly lose wars against weak peoples; which usually means that justice in this world will be denied to peoples unjustly set upon by militarily powerful nations.

Thus, the traditional theory is something of an embarrassment both to justice and to philosophy in the twenty-first century. As McMahan observes, '[w]ars are now and have always been initiated in the context of the general and largely unquestioned belief that the moral equality of combatants is true. If that background assumption were to change—if people generally believed that participation in an unjust or morally unjustified war is wrong—that could make a significant practical difference to the practice of war' (pp. 6–7). The Courage to Refuse movement among Israeli reservists who refuse to fight in the Occupied Territories is evidence that this hope might not be wildly optimistic.

Killing in War should help to quiet non-philosophers who dismiss Anglo-American philosophy for being esoteric and aloof, and philosophers who complain that little is happening in moral and political philosophy. The book's imperfections are minor; its rigor, depth, and humanity are estimable.

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doi:10.1093/mind/fzq025

Advance Access publication 1 July 2010

Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded, by
Richard Menary. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 224. H/b £55.00.

Are cognitive processes located wholly within an organism's body, or are they spread out across parts of the organism's environment? Defenders of extended cognition such as Andy Clark, Mark Rowlands, and Robert Wilson have argued that the actual processes, states, and vehicles of thought include parts of our physical, cultural, and technological environment. Richard Menary's book is an elaboration and defense of this relatively new form of externalism about mind and cognition.

The extended cognition hypothesis has been developed in many different ways. The particular version defended by Menary he dubs 'integrationism': 'the co-ordination of bodily processes of the organism with salient features of the environment, often created or maintained by the organism, allows it to perform cognitive functions that it would otherwise be unable to' (p. 3); and, moreover, when representational vehicles in the environment are manipulated in the service of executing cognitive tasks, those external structures are literally *part* of our extended cognitive system.

The first section of the book is devoted to defusing standard arguments for internalism and distinguishing cognitive integrationism from other forms of the extended cognition hypothesis. The second develops and supports integrationism by reference to a variety of domains and examples, including the evolutionary background (Ch. 5) and developmental trajectory (Ch. 7) of integrated cognitive systems. The anti-internalist arguments are familiar, and are briskly summarized in chapter one. Those unacquainted with the anti-internalist case will find this a most useful review. Chapter three argues, compellingly in my view, that several recent internalist criticisms of extended cognition are not decisive. I will focus here on Menary's attempt to distinguish his position from others in the same neighborhood, and to render it a plausible alternative to internalism (Chs. 2, 4, and 6).

In establishing integrationism, Menary opens by attacking several ways in which others have argued for extended cognition. According to the Parity Principle, an extra-bodily process is part of an organism's cognitive processing in the event that it is *functionally similar* to an intracranial cognitive process. Parity-style arguments have so far provided much of the motivation for extended cognition. Menary argues that parity is at best a heuristic guide to whether we have an integrated body-world cognitive system. In itself, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for such integration. It is not necessary because manipulation of external representational resources (in, memory or reasoning, for example) may be arbitrarily different in its functional organization from internal manipulations. In Clark and Chalmers's famous case of amnesiac Otto and his notebook (see Clark and Chalmers 'The Extended Mind', *Analysis*, 58, 1998, pp. 7–19), the external representations are not manipulated in a way that resembles the internal processes that govern human memory. These disparities have been the source of much recent criticism of extended cognition. Menary agrees that they are dissimilar, but says that we should still think of them as memory processes in some broad sense. His later discussion of systematicity and connectionism (Ch. 6) also illustrates the same point in greater detail. Cognitive systems can, and often do, have a hybrid functional nature.

While this argument potentially defuses one line of objection to extended cognition, Menary goes further and claims that parity is not sufficient for integration either. It is here that he most strikingly distinguishes his account from competing versions of external cognition. He says, for instance: 'Otto's

manipulation of external vehicles is not cognitive because it is similar to Inga's biological memory, but because Otto and his notebook constitute "an integrated system for holding and manipulating information during the performance of complex cognitive tasks" (p. 74).

If functional parity is not what integrates bodily and extra-bodily systems, what does? First, an organism must be reciprocally causally coupled to the environment (Ch. 2). But causal coupling alone is not sufficient either: 'we also need to take into account the normativity of cognition' (p. 50). No merely causal interaction between a creature and the external representations it manipulates will make those representations part of its extended cognitive processes. What will do so is these manipulations being subject to an appropriate set of norms for properly using them to carry out cognitive tasks. While 'manipulations of internal and external vehicles are causally integrated', he suggests, 'we should place this within a wider cultural and normative context' (p. 58).

Menary considers four sorts of integrated body-world relationships: biological coupling, so-called 'epistemic actions', self-correcting actions, and cognitive practices. In each case a distinctive sort of norm is operative. Where manipulating the environment is a specific biological adaptation, for instance, the norms in question are biofunctional norms. In the case of cognitive practices, 'we learn or acquire a practice that is an established method of manipulating representations to produce an end' (p. 137). It is only where there is some component of normativity that causal coupling becomes cognitive integration.

The normativity claim is the most intriguing component of Menary's picture of extended cognition. It highlights a possible line of argument that has been largely neglected by others in the debate. But it is not obvious what work norms *per se* are doing in this case. What powers does normativity have, such that adding it to a merely causally coupled system turns it into an integrated cognitive system? This is one place where more detail would have been welcome, given the pivotal role of normativity in distinguishing the integrationist view from its competitors.

At a minimum, it seems that the organism must register or recognize the relevant norms in some way for them to have an effect on its cognitive functioning. The norms in question are tied to success in carrying out various cognitive tasks: using Arabic numerals in the right way to carry out a long division problem on paper, for instance, or organizing objects in space so that they will be easier to recall in the right order. A causal story will not say 'why this series of manipulations, as opposed to any other is right, why I ought to have done it this way rather than another' (p. 129). What normativity consists in, then, is something to do with having as a goal the completion of a certain task and being well- or ill-suited to carry out that task.

Here two points that are central to Menary's case for integrationism seem to come into tension with one another: the rejection of the parity principle,

and the embrace of the normativity requirement for integration. Consider the case against parity first. There are two readings of the principle:

- (PP₁) For any internal cognitive process, if something functionally similar to it were to take place at least partially outside the body, it would be cognitive as well
- (PP₂) For any process, whether it occurs inside or outside the body, if it meets the specifications that cognitive processes must meet, we should consider it cognitive without respect to its location

Roughly, PP₁ defines external processes as cognitive if they match internal ones, while PP₂ defines cognitive processes generally in terms that are indifferent to location.

Menary seems to take parity as roughly equivalent to PP₁. But if parity is supposed to be justified by appeal to functionalist principles, PP₂ seems the more appealing interpretation. As Menary himself notes (p. 56), it would be strange for defenders of extended cognition to adopt a reading of parity that privileges internal processes in specifying the functional roles that define various cognitive systems. In addition, Menary makes claims that seem to be endorsements of PP₂. For example, on his view '[a] process is cognitive when it aims at completing a cognitive task; and it is constituted by manipulating a vehicle' (p. 57). For each cognitive task there are specifications of the functional profiles of processes that are adequate to complete that task. This definition of a cognitive process is neutral about their spatial location in just the way that PP₂ requires.

Having the function of carrying out a certain task is fundamental to whether a process is cognitive or not. And functions generate norms, at least in a thin sense—if the function of *x* is to *F*, then *x* is in some way failing to do what it ought if it does not *F*. (These norms are precisely as substantial as the notion of a system 'malfunctioning'.) While detail on this point is lacking, the thin sense of normativity seems to be all that is at stake in Menary's examples. It seems, then, that functional properties are really doing the heavy lifting in integrating organisms and their environment. This is a point that a defender of extended cognition who relies on the parity principle could happily agree with. Normativity is not a kind of glue that makes integrated systems from merely coupled ones; it is a by-product of that coupled system having the right sort of functional organization. On this reading, a kind of parity principle underlies Menary's case for cognitive integration as well. Integration requires being norm-governed, but the only way something can be governed by the appropriate norms is by having the right sort of functional organization; so integration is ultimately a matter of how a system functions (combined perhaps with causal coupling). And this is, in its general outlines, the way that advocates of the parity principle have tended to argue.

This tension points to the need for more discussion of how norms can play the crucial role in cognitive integration. But is integrationism itself plausible? Menary persuasively presents a wide range of studies and phenomena that show a tight dependence of many of our cognitive abilities on the right sort of environment. The discussions of epistemic actions and cognitive practices in particular provide much for the internalist to think about. One great virtue of this book, and the extended cognition movement more generally, is that it highlights such philosophically overlooked facts about our capacities to build social and technological environments to suit our purposes. Philosophers of mind have not paid much attention to how we shape the environment in ways that augment our cognitive abilities, simplify problem solving, and enable greater and more efficient information storage. Having one's attention drawn to these facts can induce a Necker-cube-like shift of perspective. As with the Necker cube, it may not be a permanent shift; but, as also with the cube, it may reveal previously hidden depths.

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doi:10.1093/mind/fzq038

Advance Access publication 19 July 2010

The Conversation of Humanity, by Stephen Mulhall. Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007. Pp. 136. H/b \$25.

There is a view of language which regards its most basic function as that of representing reality or 'the world' by pointing to it in some way or other. On this view (to borrow terms from Frege) the sense of an utterance lies in its relation to the world. All other aspects of language use — commanding, promising, asking, and so on — can be explained in terms of forces of different kinds operating on this basic sense. Recurrently attractive though this view seems to be when people philosophize, it also regularly attracts opponents in whose eyes it is not merely mistaken but deeply and dangerously so. Among these opponents, the alternative idea of language as a conversation is common, and the title of this book reveals that Stephen Mulhall is one of these opponents. Based on the Page-Barbour Lectures given at the University of Virginia in 2005, it explores the question of language by comparing principally four philosophers known for their opposition to any conception of language that construes it as mirroring the world — namely Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Cavell. These are all thinkers who regularly verge on the obscure, so any overview of their leading ideas is bound to