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Mind Advance Access originally published online on September 4, 2009
Mind 2009 118(471):803-809; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp103
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© Hershenov 2009

Discussions

Organisms and their Bodies: Response to LaPorte

David B. Hershenov

Philosophy Department University at Buffalo 135 Park Hall Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 USA dh25{at}buffalo.edu


  Abstract

I argue that a corpse cannot be identified with an earlier living body, because it acquires and retains parts in different ways. Contrary to what Joseph LaPorte maintains, there can be neither one principle of part-assimilation nor a non-disjunctive account of persistence conditions that can establish the identity of a living body and a later corpse.


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