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Mind Advance Access originally published online on September 3, 2009
Mind 2009 118(471):771-775; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp102
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© Barnett 2009

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Yalcin on ‘Might’

David Barnett

Department of Philosophy University of Colorado at Boulder Campus Box 232, Hellems 167 Boulder, CO 80309-232 USA David.B.Barnett{at}Colorado.edu


  Abstract

On one view about the word ‘might’, to say, sincerely and literally, that it might be that S is to say something about one’s epistemic state (and perhaps also about the epistemic states of those around one). For convenience, I will call this the natural view about ‘might’. On one version of the natural view, to say that it might be that S is to say that what one is certain of is consistent with the proposition that S. Seth Yalcin (2007) has argued that all versions of the natural view are wrong. My aim in this article is to show how at least one version of the natural view escapes Yalcin’s argument.


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Mind, July 1, 2009; 118(471): 785 - 793.
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