Mind Advance Access originally published online on August 19, 2009
Mind 2009 118(471):739-769; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp097
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Objectivity
Department of Philosophy
Columbia University
708 Philosophy Hall 1150 Amsterdam Ave
MC: 4971 New York, NY 10027
USA
Department of Philosophy
University College London Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
UK
| Abstract |
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Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules. Properly developed, this resource can be used against various forms of idealism, and to defend a conception of transcendental arguments that presupposes neither verificationism nor transcendental idealism. The article contrasts its approach with other recent transcendental treatments. It also addresses the relation between its argument and Principles of Significance. I close with a discussion of the right way of handling the extreme generality necessarily involved in transcendental reasoning.