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Mind Advance Access originally published online on August 28, 2009
Mind 2009 118(471):555-581; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp096
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© Horsten 2009

Levity

Leon Horsten

Department of Philosophy University of Bristol 9 Woodland Road Bristol BS8 1TB UK
Institute of Philosophy University of Leuven Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 B-3000 Leuven Belgium Leon.Horsten{at}bristol.ac.uk


  Abstract

In this article, the prospects of deflationism about the concept of truth are investigated. A new version of deflationism, called inferential deflationism, is articulated and defended. It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist views such as Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth and Field’s version of deflationism.


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