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Mind 2009 118(470):353-367; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp058
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© Bridges 2009

Discussions

Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency

Jason Bridges

1115 E. 58th St. Philosophy Department University of Chicago Chicago, IL 60637 USA bridges{at}uchicago.edu


  Abstract

Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny's defence of it—particularly his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it is not—is unsuccessful.


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