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Mind 2009 118(470):295-321; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp033
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© Bueno and Shalkowski 2009

Modalism and Logical Pluralism

Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski

Department of Philosophy University of Miami Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA e-mail: otaviobueno{at}mac.com Department of Philosophy University of Leeds Leeds LS2 9JT UK e-mail: s.shalkowski{at}leeds.ac.uk


   Abstract

Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses.


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