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Mind 2007 116(463):597-602; doi:10.1093/mind/fzm597
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© Peijnenburg 2007

Infinitism Regained

Jeanne Peijnenburg

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands Jeanne.Peijnenburg{at}rug.nl


  Abstract

Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition E0 is made probable by E1, which in turn is made probable by E2, which is made probable by E3, and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism.


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