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Mind 2005 114(456):1135-1183; doi:10.1093/mind/fzi1135
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© Schiffer 2005

Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions

Stephen Schiffer

Department of Philosophy, New York University, 503 Silver Center, 100 Washington Square East, New York 10003, USA

The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.


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