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Mind 2008 117(466):267-302; doi:10.1093/mind/fzn044
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© McDaniel and Bradley 2008

Desires

Kris McDaniel and Ben Bradley

Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, 541 Hall of Languages, Syracuse, NY 13244-1170, USA krmcdani{at}syr.eduwbradley{at}syr.edu


  Abstract

It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional desire. From the failures of those attempts, we draw a moral that leads us to the correct account of conditional desires. We then extend the account of conditional desires to an account of all desires. It emerges that desires do not have the structure that they have been thought to have. We attempt to explain the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desire in light of our account of desire. We show how to use our account to solve Wollheim's paradox of democracy and to save modus ponens. Finally, we extend the account of desire to related phenomena, such as conditional promises, intentions, and commands.


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