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Mind 2009 118(470):323-351; doi:10.1093/mind/fzp034
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© Clarke 2009

Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism

Randolph Clarke

Department of Philosophy Florida State University 151 Dodd Hall Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA rkclarke{at}fsu.edu


  Abstract

This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points of dispute concerning free will.


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