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Mind 2009 118(469):101-119; doi:10.1093/mind/fzn153
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© Hawley 2009

Identity and Indiscernibility

Katherine Hawley

Departments of Philosophy University of St Andrews Fife, KY16 9AL UK kjh5{at}st-and.ac.uk


  Abstract

Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.


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