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Mind 2008 117(468):795-841; doi:10.1093/mind/fzn054
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© Choi 2008

Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals

Sungho Choi

The Department of Philosophy Kyunghee University Hoegi-Dong, Dongdaemun-gu Seoul, 130-701 South Korea The Department of Philosophy The University of Sydney The Main Quadrangle A14 Sydney NSW 2006 Australia


   Abstract

For the last several decades, dispositional properties have been one of the main topics in metaphysics. Still, however, there is little agreement among contemporary metaphysicians on the nature of dispositional properties. Apparently, though, the majority of them have reached the consensus that dispositional ascriptions cannot be analysed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. In this paper it will be argued that this consensus is wrong. Specifically, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, which is generally thought to be dead, is in fact an adequate analysis of dispositions. I will go on to discuss Mumford's view of dispositions from the perspective of the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.


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