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Mind 2008 117(468):783-794; doi:10.1093/mind/fzn051
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© Block 2008

Indicative Conditionals in Context

Eliza Block

Department of Philosophy New York University 5 Washington Place New York, NY 10003 USA eliza.block{at}nyu.edu


  Abstract

I discuss an argument given by Dorothy Edgington for the conclusion that indicative conditionals cannot express propositions. The argument is not effective against Robert Stalnaker's context-dependent propositional theory. I isolate and defend the feature of Stalnaker's theory that allows it to evade the argument.


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