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Mind 2008 117(468):1051-1057; doi:10.1093/mind/fzn036
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© Ferreira 2008

Discussions

The Co-ordination Principles: A Problem for Bilateralism

Fernando Ferreira

Universidade de Lisboa Campo Grande, Edifício C6, 2 P-1746-016 Lisboa Portugal


  Abstract

In ‘"Yes" and "No"’ (2000), Ian Rumfitt proposed bilateralism—a use-based account of the logical words, according to which the sense of a sentence is determined by the conditions under which it is asserted and denied. One of Rumfitt's key claims is that bilateralism can provide a justification of classical logic. This paper raises a techical problem for Rumfitt's proposal, one that seems to undermine the bilateralist programme.

            The division of thoughts (judgements) into affirmative and negative is of no use to logic, and I doubt if it can be carried through.

            Gottlob Frege

            Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter


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