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Mind 2007 116(464):1055-1078; doi:10.1093/mind/fzm1055
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© Tennant 2007

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Existence and Identity in Free Logic: A Problem for Inferentialism?

Neil Tennant

Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA email tennant{at}osu.edu


  Abstract

Peter Milne (2007) poses two challenges to the inferential theorist of meaning. This study responds to both. First, it argues that the method of natural deduction idealizes the essential details of correct informal deductive reasoning. Secondly, it explains how rules of inference in free logic can determine unique senses for the existential quantifier and the identity predicate. The final part of the investigation brings out an underlying order in a basic family of free logics.


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