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Mind 2007 116(463):723-726; doi:10.1093/mind/fzm723
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© Williamson 2007

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Knowledge Within the Margin for Error

Timothy Williamson

New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, UK timothy.williamson{at}philosophy.oxford.ac.uk


  Abstract

Roy Sorensen's criticism of my use of margin for error principles to explain ignorance in borderline cases fails because it misidentifies the relevant margin for error principles. His alternative explanation in terms of truth-maker gaps is briefly criticized.


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