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Mind 2005 114(456):915-927; doi:10.1093/mind/fzi915
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© Cartwright 2005

Remarks on Propositional Functions

Richard L. Cartwright

Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA

Peter Geach has said that Russell's use of ‘propositional function’ is ‘hopelessly confused and inconsistent’. Geach is right, and attempts to say what exactly a Russellian propositional function is, or is supposed to be, are bound to end in frustration. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to pursue an account of propositional functions that accommodates a good deal of what Russell says about them and that can provide some of what he expected of them.


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