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Mind 2005 114(455):481-508; doi:10.1093/mind/fzi481
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© Kolodny 2005

Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability

Benj Hellie

The Sage School of Philosophy, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA benj.hellie{at}cornell.edu

Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.


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