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Mind 2002 111(442):201-224; doi:10.1093/mind/111.442.201
© 2002 by Mind Association
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Humean Compatibilism

Helen Beebee1 and Alfred Mele2

1 Centre for Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK helen.beebee{at}man.ac.uk 2 Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500, USA almele{at}mailer.fsu.edu

Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are ‘up to us’ and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism—the consequence argument—has a false premiss. We also display some striking similarities between Humean compatibilism and libertarianism, an incompatibilist view. For example, standard libertarians face a problem about luck, and we show that Humean compatibilists face a very similar problem.


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