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Mind 2001 110(438):319-333; doi:10.1093/mind/110.438.319
© 2001 by Mind Association
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The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure

Charles B. Cross1

1 Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602–1627, USA.ccross@uga.edu

In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.


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