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Mind 1999 108(431):503-538; doi:10.1093/mind/108.431.503
© 1999 by Mind Association
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Logical constants

K Warmbrõd

Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3T 2N2. E-mail: warmbro@cc.umanitoba.ca

There is as yet no settled consensus as to what makes a term a logical constant or even as to which terms should be recognized as having this status. This essay sets out and defends a rationale for identifying logical constants. I argue for a two-tiered approach to logical theory. First, a secure, core logical theory recognizes only a minimal set of constants needed for deductively systematizing scientific theories. Second, there are extended logical theories whose objectives are to systematize various pre-theoretic, modal intuitions. The latter theories may recognize a variety of additional constants as needed in order to formalize a given set of intuitions.


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