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Mind 1998 107(426):403-410; doi:10.1093/mind/107.426.403
© 1998 by Mind Association
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A refutation of the doomsday argument

KB KorbA1 and JJ OliverA2

A1 School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia korb@cs.monash.edu.au A2 Ultimode Systems LLC, 2560 Bancroft Way #213, Berkeley, California 94704, USA jono@ultimode.com

Carter and Leslie's Doomsday Argument maintains that reflection upon the number of humans born thus far, when that number is viewed as having been uniformly randomly selected from amongst all humans, past, present and future, leads to a dramatic rise in the probability of an early end to the human experiment. We examine the Bayesian structure of the Argument and find that the drama is largely due to its oversimplification.


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