© 1998 by Mind Association
Yablo's paradox and kindred infinite liars
Department of Philosophy, New York University, 503 Main Building, 100 Washington Square East, New York, NY 10003-6688, USA. E-mail: sorensen@is2.nyu.edu
This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I rebut objections that Yablo's paradox is not a genuine liar by constructing a sequence of liars that blend into Yablo's paradox. I rebut objections that Yablo's liar has hidden self-reference with a distinction between attributive and referential self-reference and appeals to Gregory Chaitin's algorithmic information theory. The paper concludes with comments on the mystique of self-reference.
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R. T. Cook Curry, Yablo and duality Analysis, October 1, 2009; 69(4): 612 - 620. [Full Text] [PDF] |
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